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Klis: New Patterned Defense Instructions

REFORMS TO CRIMINAL
DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS: NEW
PATTERNED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH
ACCOUNT FOR THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE
BATTERED WOMAN WHO KILLS
HER BATTERING MATE
Deborrah Ann Klis*

"I was transfixed with horror, and over me there
swept the sudden conviction that hanging was a
mistake - worse, a crime. It was my awakening to
one of the most terrible facts of life - that justice
and judgment lie often a world apart."1
Few issues in the American legal system evoke such varied,
yet often passionate, arguments as those surrounding the legal
treatment of the battered woman who kills her battering mate. 2
One view holds that society places a great value on human life
and that a battered woman must look to restraining orders, shel* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. My sincere thanks to Virginia Harmon, Kimberly Dunworth, Professor Joan Howarth, and Professor Susan
Rutberg for their invaluable assistance. This paper is dedicated to Eleanor R. Shuler, my
mother, and Suzanne R. Harper, my dear friend, both of whom support me
immeasurably.
1. Emmeline Pankhurst, My Own Story, in THE QUOTABLE WOMAN 245 (Elaine
Partnow ed., 1977).
2. Debra J. Saunders, If Helplessness Could Kill, S.F. CHRON" May 24, 1993, at A14
("[Tlhere's the claim that women with BWS suffer from 'learned helplessness,' which
makes them incapable of leaving their husbands and presumably is a justification of
sorts for seeing only a bloody way out of a relationship. Translation: It's OK to kill
mean men.").
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ters S and criminal prosecution of the batterer in order to resolve
her problems.·
On the other hand, proponents of reform to self-defense jurisprudence argue that many battered women are powerless
against their battering mates and recognize that the constructs
of battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness theory
often render the fatal acts defensive rather than retaliatory.
Notwithstanding the defensive nature of the fatal act, the battered woman who kills confronts the presumption that the intentional killing was done with malice. 1I The battered woman
confronts inadequate legal defense doctrines to either rebut the
presumption of malice, or instead, to demonstrate that the use
of force was justified for full acquittal. The following analysis
focuses on the plight of the battered woman who, by refusing to
take one more beating, becomes a criminal in the justice system.
California penal law distinguishes murder from manslaughter by determining whether the perpetrator harbored malice at
the time of the fatal act. 8 Under California law, a presumption
3. Tom Levy, Reining in Rage on the Homefront, S.F. CHRON., September 8, 1992,
at D3. A San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium joined forces with designer, Liz
Claiborne, to push domestic violence to the top of San Francisco's issues list. The article
noted a worsening crisis, namely that "four-fifths of battered women needing emergency
shelter must be turned away." Id.
4. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 174 (Ct. App. 1989). In Aris, the defendant
killed her battering mate while he slept. The court permitted generalized testimony of
battered woman's syndrome at trial; however, the expert witness was not permitted to
testify as to whether the defendant personally suffered from battered woman's syndrome. The jury found Aris guilty of second degree murder and sentenced her to 15
years to life in prison. In May 1993, California Governor Pete Wilson granted clemency
to Aris, thereby commuting her sentence to 12 years to life and allowing her to be considered for parole sooner. Id.
5. This presumption applies to all intentional killings. See; e.g., People v. Bobo, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 756 (Ct. App. 1990). This opinion has been certified for publication
with the exception of parts III through XIII; the unpublished portion of the opinion
illustrates the distinction between medical diagnosis of a serious mental disease and the
legal definition of insanity. In Bobo, the court of appeal affirmed defendant's convictions
of arson and first degree murder. Bobo stabbed her three children, immersed them in the
bathtub and set fire to her apartment. The jury found that Bobo was sane during the
commission of the crimes. The court held that no other mental state need be shown
other than a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill. The court further held that once
such an intention is proved in the context of an actual killing, the offense can be no less
than murder unless the killing results from a sudden quarrel or heat of passion upon
adequate provocation, or perhaps an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend. See id.
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 188, 189, 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). Section 192
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of malice exists when an intentional homicide occurs. 7 Malice is
express when the defendant manifested a deliberate intention to
unlawfully take the life of another human being. Malice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned or malignant heart. 8 In order to mitigate murder to manslaughter, a
defendant has the burden of raising a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jury as to the presence of malice. For full acquittal,
a defendant has the burden of raising a reasonable doubt that
such force was justified.9
This comment uses the plight of Brenda Denise Aris to illustrate the criminal defenses available to a battered woman
who kills her aggressor. IO Since the 1989 decision in Aris, California Governor Pete Wilson granted executive clemency to
Aris.11 Governor Wilson reduced Aris' fifteen years to life sentence to twelve years to life. 12 Another significant event since the
decision in Aris is the passage of California Assembly Bill 785 in
1991. The Bill added Section 1107 to the California Evidence
states in part, "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing without malice." Manslaughter is of
three kinds: "1. voluntary - upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion provocation; 2.
involuntary - in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony; or in the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner; or 3.
vehicular manslaughter:" [d. Section 188 provides:
Such malice may be expressed or implied. It is expressed when
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned or malignant heart. When
it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing
of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no
other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state
of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness or an obligation
to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor
acting despite such awareness is included within the definition
of malice.
7. See Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
8. See supra note 6.
9. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN M. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(c) (2d ed.
1986); see also People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1979) (recognizing the imperfect
self-defense doctrine in California and declaring that the unreasonable belief rule should,
henceforth, be considered a general principle for purposes of jury instructions).
10. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 167. .
11. California Governor Reduces Jail Terms of Two Battered Women, REUTERS,
LIMITED, May 28, 1993.
12. [d.
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Code,I8 which permits expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome. The testimony may include expert opinion concerning the physical, emotional, or mental effects of the battering upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of domestic
violence victims. I4 The proponent of the evidence must only establish its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert
witness. 111 Despite these changes, the Aris decision provides an
effective vehicle to demonstrate the obstacles confronting a battered woman when she enters the justice system.
Brenda Aris killed her batterer, who was also her husband,
while he slept. Ie The State of California prosecuted Aris for
murder despite that on the night of the killing, Aris' husband
had beaten her and had threatened to kill her when he awoke. I?
Aris testified that during her ten year marriage her husband had
beaten her, often severely, and that she had left him many
times. I8 By a mixture of threats and cajoling, he invariably convinced her to take him back. I9 Numerous witnesses for the de13. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993), which states:
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the defense regarding battered
women's syndrome, including physical, emotional, or mental
effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of
domestic violence, except when offered against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse
which form the basis of the criminal charge.
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its
relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert witness.
Expert opinion testimony on battered women's syndrome shall
not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability
is unproven.
(c) For purposes of this section, "abuse" is defined in Section
6203 of the Family Code and "domestic violence" is defined
... in Section 6211 of the Family Code.
(d) This section is intended as a rule of evidence only and no
substantive change affecting the Penal Code is intended.
See also Scott Gregory Baker, Deaf Justice?: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned
Prior to the Enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
(forthcoming Spring 1994) (advocating retroactive application of Evidence Code Section
1107 as proposed in California Assembly Bill 2295).
14. Id. § 1107(a).
15. Id. § 1107(b).
16. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19. Id. at 171.
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fense testified to the beatings. Aris testified that on the night of
the killing, her husband beat her and threatened that he did not
think he was going to let her live until the morning. 20 She believed he was "very serious."21 When Aris' husband fell asleep
she went next door to get some ice to ease the pain the blows to
her face had caused. There she found a handgun on top of the
refrigerator and took it "for protection."22 Aris testified that this
measure of protection was necessary because she felt her husband would probably be awake and he would start hitting her
again. 2s Aris stated that when she returned to the bedroom, she
then sat down on the bed and felt that she had to do it; she felt
that when her husband awoke he would hurt her very badly or
even kill her.24 Aris killed her husband by shooting him five
times in the back while he slept.211 A jury convicted Aris of second degree murder. She was sentenced to fifteen years to life in
prison. 26
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction despite Aris'
contentions that the trial court erred in: (1) excluding expert
testimony that she was a battered woman and that it had affected her mental condition at the time of the killing; (2) refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense; (3) incorrectly instructing on "imminence" as part of the unreasonable selfdefense doctrine; (4) incorrectly instructing the jury about "heat
of passion" and "cooling off"; and (5) excluding evidence of her
husband's violent character.27 Essentially, the court of appeal affirmed a finding of retaliation rather than justified resistance.
The jury found the presence of malice despite expert testimony concerning battered woman's syndrome and Aris' testimony involving her honest and actual belief in the need to defend herself. The following comment focuses on the
phenomenon of battered woman syndrome, and how the syndrome interplays with the viability of the current criminal de20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. Aris also asserted prosecutorial and juror misconduct as grounds for reversal.

[d.
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fenses that are available to a battered woman who kills her aggressor. Finally, this comment proposes reform to criminal
defense instructions which presently prevent battered women
from asserting an effective defense.
I. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
National estimates of the pervasiveness of domestic violence
suggest that there are as many as four million incidents of domestic violence against women each year. 28 According to Federal
Bureau of Investigation statistics, a woman is beaten every eighteen seconds. 29 The Surgeon General indicates that domestic violence is one of the leading causes of injury to women. so In fact,
recent commentary suggests that more American women,
whether rich or poor, are injured by the men in their lives than
by car accidents, muggings and rape combined. sl Most women
do not strike back. Of the 1.6 to 4 million women who are beaten
each year, approximately 800 to 1000 will be charged with the
murder of an abusive spouse or companion. s2 These figures indicate that the frequency of deadly force, applied by millions of
battered women, is minimal.
The term "battered woman" describes a woman who is the
victim of violence perpetrated by her partner and who remains
in the relationship after repeated incidents of violence. ss The
28. Note, Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1501 (1993) (citing Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1990) (testimony of Angela
Browne, Ph.D.».
29. Id. at 1501 (citing Donna Moore, Editor's Introduction: An Overview of the
Problem, in BATTERED WOMAN 7, 14 (Donna Moore ed., 1979».
30. Id. (citing Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health
Service, 267 JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992) (noting that "a recent study found violence to be
the 'leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 through 44 years' ").
31. Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, January 18, 1993, at 38, 41 (discussing the prevalence of domestic violence and the lack of choices for battered women, as
well as their extraordinary sensitivity to danger, and public and prosecutorial opposition
to reform).
32. Between .20% and .64% of battered women kill their abusive spouse or companion. See Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363, 366 (1992) (discussing, among other
issues, the possible violations of the constitutional right to present a defense where a
victim of domestic violence establishes a foundation for battered woman syndrome expert testimony, yet such testimony is excluded).
33. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 920-21 (Ct. App. 1992). Day stabbed
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term "battered woman syndrome" is a psychological doctrine
that explains the victimization of women and how the process of
victimization further entraps them. The result is a psychological
paralysis to leave the relationship; the "rationale is the construct
of learned helplessness. "34
A.

COMPONENTS OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

Battered women include wives or women in any form of an
intimate relationship. In order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. 311 If the woman remains in the relationship after the second incident, she is defined as a battered woman. 36 Repetitious
violent behavior directed at the woman typically occurs in three
distinct and continual stages which vary in duration and intensity depending on the individuals involved. 37 Phase one of the
Brown, her boyfriend, in self-defense when he broke in the bathroom where she had
barricaded herself after an evening of violence and threats. Brown opened the door and
approached her with a knife. They fell to the floor and then to the bed. Day did not
recall stabbing Brown so severely; so she fled assuming he would come after her. Day had
never filed a formal complaint against Brown despite a history of severe physical abuse.
Day even hesitated to phone the police after arriving at a girlfriend's house because the
police had treated her badly in the past. Despite the fact that the killing occurred at the
height of a battering incident, Day was prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter and found
guilty of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. The court of appeal reversed on grounds that Day was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present evidence of battered woman syndrome. The court noted that evidence of battered woman
syndrome would have "bolstered appellant's credibility and lent credence to her selfdefense claim." [d.; see also Denise Bricker, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered
Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony For Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive
Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1993) (concerning the applicability of battered
woman syndrome expert testimony for intimate violence for gay and lesbian victims of
abuse).
34. Lenore Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, in WOMEN AND
THE LAW, 601-07 (Mary Joe Frug ed., 1992). See also Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 177 in which
the court stated, "The battered' woman often does not know why she is beaten on any
particular occasion. The violence is perceived by the woman 'as random and aversive
stimulation.' Because of its randomness, she believes she is incapable of doing anything
to prevent the abuse and, as a result, feels helpless."
35. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
36. See id.; see also New Jersey v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984). Kelly fatally
stabbed her husband with a pair of scissors. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed
and remanded the reckless manslaughter conviction as it was error to exclude expert
testimony on battered-woman syndrome. On remand, the trial court received an instruction to admit the testimony, if relevant to the honesty and reasonableness of Kelly's
belief that deadly force was necessary to protect her against death or serious bodily
injury.
37. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176; see also Kelly, 478 A.2d at 370-72 (discussing Dr.
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battering cycle is referred to as the tension-building stage. During this stage the battering male engages in minor battering incidents and verbal abuse while the woman attempts to be as placating and passive as possible in order to stave off more serious
violence. 88
Phase two is the most violent point of the cycle. 89 In this
acute phase, the violence seems to last somewhere between a few
hours to possibly twenty-four to forty-eight hours.4o Battered
women often describe the violent incidents during this phase as
random. It is not uncommon for the batterer to wake a woman
from a deep sleep to begin the assault.41
Phase three of the battering cycle is characterized by extreme contrition and loving behavior on the part of the battering
male. 41l The man will often "mix his pleas for forgiveness and
protestations of devotion with promises to seek professional
help."48 The period of relative calm may last as long as several
months." However, in some cases phase three is so short that it
may not be noticeable. The tension may quickly start to build
again and the cycle begins anew. 411
The cyclical nature of the battering may explain why a battered woman simply does not leave her abuser.46 The batterer's
loving behavior towards his mate during phase three may convince her that her mate will change. This may keep her bound to
Lenore Walker's book THE BATJ'ERED WOMAN).
38. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371.
39. See Lenore E. Walker, How Battering Happens and How to Stop It, in BATTERED WOMEN 68-69 (1979); see also Gina Boubion, Women Who Killed Their Mates
Seeking Clemency in California, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 8 1992, where the author discusses the plight of Brenda Clubine. At the time Clubine killed her abusive husband, he was wanted on a charge of felony battery for rubbing his wife's face so hard on
the carpet that her skin came off. She weighed 88 pounds to his 260. In the previous six
years, he broke her ribs and fractured her skull repeatedly. She suffers from mild brain
damage which may have been caused by repeated beatings.
40. See Walker, supra note 39, at 68-69.
41. Id.
42.Id.
43. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371.
44.Id.
45. See Walker, supra note 39, at 71; see also Andersen, supra note 32, at 370 (noting that as cycles recur within the abusive relationship, the violence escalates in severity
and acute beatings occur more frequently).
46. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371.
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the relationship!' The woman's response to her situation varies
from silence and denial to demoralization and degradation so severe that a psychological paralysis results.·8
While the above three-stage normative model may accurately describe the battering cycle occurring in the lives of many
battered women, proponents of reform in self-defense jurisprudence have expressed concern over strict adherence to such a
model!e Strict adherence to a proto-typical, distinctive stage
model may preclude testimony of battered woman syndrome. A
trial judge may refuse to admit evidence of domestic violence
because the pattern of abuse does not precisely fit into the three
stages. IIO Accordingly, this comment suggests that the three
phase model should not be relied on to establish the relevancy
for battered woman syndrome expert testimony at trial. Instead,
it should emphasize that (1) a battering incident has occurred
more than once and (2) the woman remained in the situation.
The broader offer of proof will not bring about meritless claims.
The justice system has previously recognized the basic two-part
definition suggested above as the basis for classifying a victim of
domestic violence as a battered woman. III

B.

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND SOCIAL FACTORS

1. Learned Helplessness

Learned Helplessness theory comprises the second component of battered woman syndrome. Based on social learning and
47. Id.; see also People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1992). Day testified that Brown, her mate, began beating her early in their relationship. Day loved
Brown despite his violent behavior. She attributed the beatings to his alcohol problem
and believed if she stayed with him and they worked together, their relationship would
improve. However, Brown's violence against Day increased with time in both frequency
and duration. Id.
48. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
49. See Panel Discussion, Courtroom, Code and Clemency: Reform in Self-Defense
Jurisprudence for Battered Women, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 829, 833 (i993). Attorney Rebecca Isaacs expressed concern over the propriety of strict adherence to a normative model. Isaacs suggests that "expert testimony should include a broad conception of
battering in society, including the obstacles faced in leaving a relationship, social and
cultural factors, the dynamics of abuse, as well as the specific experiences of the woman
on trial." These issues were a few of the topics raised in a discussion of the problems
with laws regarding battered woman syndrome admissibility. Id.
50.Id.
51. See, e.g., Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
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cognitive and motivational theoretical principles, the theory explains the psychological paralysis that maintains the victim status of a battered woman. 1I2 Martin Seligman developed the
learned helplessness theory during an experiment in which dogs
received repetitious, unavoidable shocks. liS After repeated
shocks, the dogs failed to attempt to es~ape the shock. 1I4 The
principle of learned helplessness has been shown to apply
equally to humans. 1I11
The first phase within the theory of learned helplessness, as
applied to victims of domestic violence, occurs when continuous
aversive events cause battered women to feel powerless. The
powerlessness over the violence creates a .belief that control is
not possible. liS Battered women do not attempt to gain freedom
from a battering relationship because they do not believe they
can escape the domination. They learn that their voluntary responses have no effect on the consequences in their lives. 1I7
2. External Social and Economic Factors

The feeling of powerlessness to escape the repetitious violence is also reinforced by social stereotypes. lIB A "happy family"
stereotype promotes isolation from friends and family so others
52. See Walker, supra note 34, at 601-04 (discussing the basic components of the
learned helplessness theory, the applicability of the theory on the human species, battered women's pervasive belief of powerlessness and the belief that they are helpless to
control violence administered against them).
53. PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO. PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 246 (1985) (discussing the work of
Martin Seligman on Operant Conditioning: Learning About Consequence and Unusual
Contingencies).
54. Id. In the original study, different groups of dogs wimt through a two-phase experiment. In Phase One, they received painful, unavoidable shocks which some dogs
could escape by learning to press a switch. The others continued to receive the shock no
matter what they did. In Phase two, the dogs were put into a different apparatus, in
which escape was possible simply by jumping over a small hurdle. A tone (conditioned
stimulus) signaled that the shocks were about to start. The subjects that had learned to
escape in the earlier situation quickly learned the new response, but the others rarely did
so. Instead, they just crouched, passively getting shocked. This general response following non-contingent, inescapable shocks was termed "learned helplessness". [d.
55. [d.
56. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
57. See Walker, supra note 34, at 604-05.
58. Book Note, Generalizing Justice Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill
and How Society Responds, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1384, 1386 (1990) (discussing biases embedded in the legal standards and arguing that misconceptions about violent relationships distort jurors' attitudes about battered women's experiences).
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never discover how profoundly violent the woman's life actually
is. 1I9 Some battered women lie so frequently that they confuse
their own reality; they make excuses for their men and assume
self-blame. Sometimes women do not leave their batterers because they grow up in cultures that are so immersed in violence
that they fail to comprehend that there are alternative, non-violent places to gO.60 Despite academic and career independence,
when it comes to relationships with men, many battered woman
resort to traditional stereotyped behavior. Moreover, when children are involved, the stigma that attaches to a woman who
leaves such a family unit may keep her from leaving. 61
Women who want to leave their abusive mates may have
difficulty because of a lack of material resources. 62 Women often
earn less money63 and have more responsibility in taking care of
the household and children. Although a typical first reaction to a
confrontation with violence may be to fiee, a battered woman
often realizes that she has no place to gO.64
When victims of domestic violence endure unprovoked repetitious violence, which is coupled with social pressures and expectations, severe emotional and motivational deficits result.
Battered women typically do not accept assistance because they
believe it will not be effective. They see their batterers as all
powerful and themselves as powerless. Consequently, they see no
safety for themselves. Viewing a domestic violence victim's behavior in this light provides a rationale why women remain in a
59. See Walker, supra note 34, at 604-05.
60. See Gibbs, supra note 31, at 42-43 (discussing the absence of options for the
battered woman, which is evident by conditions such as: 1) the fact that New York has
about 1300 beds for a state with 18 million people, and 2) that in 1990, the Baltimore zoo
spent twice as much to care for animals as the state spent on shelters for victims of
domestic violence).
61. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372-73.
62. [d.
63. See e.g., Janet Holmgren McKay, Don't Equate Mills With the Citadel as Single Sex College, S.F. EXAM., Mar. 13, 1994, at A18. The President of Mills College comments that despite that women are now a slight majority in college classrooms, the 1990
census data shows that female college graduates have lifetime earnings equal to the earnings of male high school graduates. See also Beverly Medlyn, Pay Disparity Rated Top
Worry at Women's Business Gathering, ARIZONA BUSINESS GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 1994 at 6
("Women earn 76 percent of men's median pay, even though the equal-pay law has been
in effect for 30 years," said Rebecca Winterscheidt, a Phoenix lawyer who spoke on employment law to the 1994 Governor's Conference on Women and Business.).
64. [d.
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violent relationship or return to a dangerous relationship once
they have empowered themselves to leave. A logical result of
repetitious violence is that battered women perceive harm in a
different light than people who have not endured continuous violence and demoralization.
II. LEGAL DEFENSES
SYNDROME

AND

BATTERED

WOMAN'S

Brenda Aris testified that on the night that she killed her
husband, she was sure she would not live until morning. On the
night which might have proved most dangerous to her life, Aris
found the means to defend herself. Although Aris suffered ten
years of victimization, the jury found her actions to be retaliatory rather than defensive. 811
Our legal system assigns to the jury the duty of applying the
defenses raised by the battered woman who kills. 88 With the addition of Evidence Code section 1107,87 the jury will, henceforth,
receive expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome
when the defense establishes its relevance. Consequently, many
of the issues discussed above may now be considered when the
jury deliberates on the criminal defenses raised at trial. Notwithstanding the permissibility of expert testimony under section 1107, the battered woman on trial for an intentional killing
will confront obstacles under the present criminal defense
instructions.
III. THE EFFECT OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME,
THE PRESENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE DOCTRINES
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
Justice demands defense doctrines which consider the defi65. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76.
66. CAL. EVID. CODE § 312 (West 1992):
Jury as trier of fact - Except as otherwise provided by law,
where the trial is by jury: (a) All questions of fact are to be
decided by the jury; (b) Subject to the control of the court, the
jury is to determine the effect and value of the evidence addressed to it, including the credibility of witnesses and hearsay
declarants.
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
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cits of learned helplessness, battered woman's syndrome, and
the constructs of social stereotyping. The woman who kills her
batterer will not receive a fair trial if the defense doctrines do
not consider her perceptions in their totality. Women and men
may respond to situations in different manners. A man's reaction to a situation may be unjustifiable. The same reaction on
the part of a woman may be justifiable resistance, not mere retaliation. s8 The jury disregards a battered woman's lower degree
of culpability when it fails to consider the facts in their totality,
including the gender differences and the harmful consequences
of battered woman syndrome. Therefore, it is imperative that
legal doctrines accommodate the perceptions of fear at the moment in time when a battered woman staves off one more
beating.
In light of the criminal defense doctrines presently available, a battered woman would be best advised to premeditate the
fatal act. That is, by planning to have a weapon accessible during a future assault, the woman's perfect self-defense strategy
for complete exoneration will more readily correspond to the
present aggressor situation in which men often find themselves.
Undoubtedly, modern jurisprudence does not intend to encourage premeditation, however, the criminal justice system's
non-empathetic treatment of the battered woman's perceptions
of danger renders premeditation necessary to justify the use of
force.
Amendments to the justification doctrine of perfect self-defense must acknowledge the lower degree of culpability of a battered woman who kills. Courts would not abuse their duty to
society by going so far as to adopt an instruction of a "reasona68. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REv.
703, 718 (1982) (reviewing ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL (1980». The overall thesis of
Jones's book is that:
[L)aw, made by men, for men, and amassed down through history on their behalf, codifies masculine bias and systematically
discriminates against women by ignoring the woman's point of
view. Today the law is still largely enforced ... by men; so it
still works in the interests of men as a group ... [T)he result
for women is the same: they are deprived at every step of
equal protection under the law; and even those women who
receive fair and equal treatment are likely to be thought of as
having gotten away with something.
[d.
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ble battered woman standard" when applying the reasonable requirement of self-defense. Neither a reasonable man standard,
nor even a reasonable person standard can adequately contemplate the plight of the battered woman. Although Aris suffered
ten years of abuse, her mental state and perceptual abilities
were simply disregarded under a reasonable, non-battered individual standard. It would not be special treatment to apply a
battered woman standard that acknowledges the gender and situational differences of a battered woman. Instead, by broadening the standard for reasonableness, the courts would recognize
the totality of the facts. The viewpoint that battered women
must "look to ... restraining orders [and] shelters ... " is not
viable in light of the learned helplessness theory.69 Battered
women feel powerless against their mates; they will often be
manipulated or threatened into abandoning their steps of empowerment. Attention to the battered woman's right to genderequal treatment of the laws must become a legislative and judicial priority.
In addition to amending justification doctrines, such as perfect self-defense, it is equally necessary to modify the defense
instructions to mitigate murder to manslaughter. By broadening
the scope of provocation to include anything that provides a reasonable explanation for extreme emotional disturbance, the mitigation defense would thereafter consider the battered woman's
plight. Additionally, by allowing the jury to consider the battered woman's experiences when evaluating the cooling off period, the battered woman's emotional trauma and subsequent
defensive acts will not be seen as retaliatory. Instead the acts
may be found to be a justifiable response to the fear induced by
her mate's aggression and threats.
Application of the other mitigation tool of an honest, but
unreasonable belief (the imperfect self-defense doctrine) equally
requires amendment. One option is to allow the jury to consider
the sorts of external and internal forces which might make a reasonable person more likely to fail to satisfy the reasonable element of self-defense. Consideration of these forces would lend
credence to the battered woman's honest belief. This modifica'tion would render the imperfect self-defense doctrine an effec69. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
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tive mitigation tool for women like Aris.
The following discussion explores the present legal defenses
available when an intentional killing occurs. The killing will be
classified as murder unless the battered woman either negates
malice or obtains an acquittal through the doctrines of justification or excuse. Some of these defense instructions were requested in the Aris case and subsequently denied.
A.

JUSTIFICATION THROUGH PERFECT SELF-DEFENSE

Whenever justification exists, malice is ameliorated and the
defendant is not guilty of any crime. A homicide may be justified if committed in self-defense. Most states render acts of selfdefense lawful when used to resist offenses capable of injury
against one's person or family. The amount of resistive force
must be commensurate with the degree of force applied by an
assailant. The typical standard for complete exoneration is that
force which is reasonably necessary to prevent imminent injury.70 The use of deadly force is not justifiable unless the actor
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect herself against imminent death or serious bodily injury.71 While the
existence of actual necessity is not required, a valid plea of selfdefense does have a two-fold requirement. First, the law requires
an actual or honest belief on the part of the defendant in the
necessity of using force. An honest belief alone does not suffice
for complete exoneration under the perfect self-defense doctrine.
A defendant must also establish the reasonableness of her belief
in the necessity to use deadly force.72
Determining whether a defendant's belief in the necessity to
use deadly force was reasonable does not call for an evaluation
of the defendant's subjective state of mind. Instead, California
law requires an objective evaluation of the defendant's assertedly defensive acts. 73 The judicial system phrases the standard
for perfect self-defense in the objective terms of whether a reasonable person, as opposed to the defendant, would have be70.
71.
72.
73.

See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692·693 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9, § 5.7(c).
[d.
Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
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lieved and acted as the defendant did. 74
The court of appeal in Aris held that "expert testimony
about a defendant's state of mind is not relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant's self-defense."711 The Aris holding is
significantly different from the court of appeal decision three
years later in People v. Day.78 Even though Day killed her batterer in the height of a battering incident and had endured
many years of severe violence, the prosecution charged her with
voluntary manslaughter. 77 The jury convicted Day of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. The court
of appeal reversed on grounds that Day was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present evidence of battered woman syndrome. 78
The court noted that evidence of battered woman syndrome
would have "bolstered appellant's credibility and lent credence
to her self-defense claim."79 The court stated that "because
counsel was unaware of the battered woman syndrome he was
unable effectively to counter the prosecutor's contention that
[Day's] conduct was inconsistent with self-defense."8o
Notably, the California judiciary maintains incompatible
opinions concerning the utility of battered woman syndrome testimony. The fact that the California legislature added Evidence
Code section 1107 in 1991 may have had an impact on the divergent opinions of Aris and Day. Section 1107 permits expert testimony about battered woman syndrome to explain how the battered woman's particular experiences affect her perceptions of
danger and her honest belief in the imminent need to defend
herself from that danger. 81 Despite the addition of this statute,
when a woman kills her batterer and pleads perfect self-defense,
74.Id.
75.Id.
76. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 916 (Ct. App. 1992); see supra note 33.
77. Id. at 917.
78. Id. at 924-25.
79.Id.
80.Id.
81. See People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 333-35 (Ct. App. 1992). Debra and
Terrance Romero were both charged with one count of second degree robbery and four
counts of attempted robbery. Debra claimed a duress defense. She admitted the crimes
but claimed she participated because she was afraid Terrance would kill her if she did
not do as he demanded. The court of appeal agreed with Romero's claim that her lawyer
was ineffective because he failed to present expert testimony explaining battered woman
syndrome.
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she still must establish the reasonableness component of that
doctrine.
In People v. Romero, the court of appeal agreed that it was
error to exclude expert testimony concerning battered woman
syndrome in order to substantiate Romero's duress defense. 8l1
This 1992 opinion recognized that although Romero was tried in
1990 and Evidence Code section 1107 was added in 1991, there
is apparently no legislative prohibition to retroactive application
of that section. 88 The court extended the use of section 1107,
stating that the duress defense is the same as self-defense since
in both "the key issue is whether the defendant reasonably and
honestly believed she was in imminent danger of great bodily
harm or death."M At the present time, there are no published
opinions applying section 1107 to a battered woman's perfect
self-defense claim. Without express language in section 1107
which authorizes the court to consider battered woman syndrome testimony when the court considers the "reasonable" element of perfect self-defense, battered women have no assurance
of self-defense reform. If future opinions follow the court's reasoning in Aris, in cases where the battered woman maintains an
honest belief in the need to kill in self-defense, the court's failure to permit the jury to consider the reasonableness of the woman's action as a battered woman will cause the perfect selfdefense claim to fail. An honest belief alone is insufficient to
constitute complete justification for acts of resistance. 811
As a general rule, a court must provide a requested defense
instruction if there is substantial evidence to support the defense asserted. 86 On appeal, Aris argued that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense. The
court disagreed and stated that "[g]iven the definition of imminent danger in California Law. . . there was no evidence of any
reasonable indication in the sleeping victim's behavior that he
was about to attempt to harm the defendant."87 The court con82.Id.
83. See id.; but see Scott Gregory Baker, supra note 13.
84. Id. at 1160 (emphasis added).
85. See, e.g., Donald L. Creach, Partially Determined Imperfect Self Defense: The
Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615, 629-31 (1982).
86. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (citing Flannel, 603 P.2d I, 10 (Cal. 1979».
87. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
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cluded that the requisite imminent danger to Aris' life was not
apparent from the facts because there was no substantial evidence that a reasonable person under the same circumstances
would have perceived an immediate danger manifesting a need
to kill in self-defense. 88 The court stated, "no 'jury composed of
reasonable men could have concluded that' a sleeping victim
presents an imminent danger of great bodily harm, especially
when the defendant was able to, and actually did, leave the bedroom, and subsequently returned to shoot him."89
If a court refuses to instruct on perfect self-defense because

"reasonable men" would not believe that an imminent danger
was present, then battered woman syndrome testimony per section 1107 is ineffective. Instead, when a defendant raises a perfect self-defense claim, jury instructions must assist in explaining the battered woman's perception of imminent danger.
Absent reform, future judges may exclude a perfect self-defense
instruction where the raw facts at the time of the killing fall
short of the substantial evidence standard required to support
an instruction. The outcome of the Aris case supports the inference that in spite of Dr. Walker's testimony, the court disregarded the evidence of battered woman syndrome. The court focused solely on the fact that Aris' husband slept at the time Aris
fired the fatal shot.

Additionally, despite the modern trend for courts to implement a reasonable "person" standard, rather than the reasonable man standard, such instruction may nonetheless violate a
battered woman's right to equal protection. 90 In Washington v.
Wanrow, the court held that use of male pronouns in the selfdefense instruction violated the female defendant's right to
equal protection of the law. 91 The court stated that the defend88. 1d. at 181.
89. 1d. at 176 (emphasis added).
90. See Naomi R. CBhn, The Looseness 01 Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1414-16 (1992) (arguing that despite its many benefits, the reB80nable woman standard is problematic).
"[T]he reB80nable woman standard is reminiscent of earlier dominant images of white
middle clB8s women ... [which] depicted women B8 pure, chB8te, virtuous, and altruistic.... [T]he reB80nable woman standard establishes certain expectations for women
that are different than those for men ... [and] does not accommodate the experiences
of all women." 1d.
91. WB8hington v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 550-51, 558-59 (WB8h. 1977). The WB8hington Supreme Court reversed Wanrow's second degree murder conviction in a decision
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ant was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in light of
her own perceptions of the situation. 92 Failure to recognize how
a woman's status may affect her perception of danger denies a
woman "a trial by the same rules which are applicable to male
defendants."9s The error was coinpounded by utilizing language
suggesting that the defendant's conduct must be measured
against that of a reasonable male finding himself in the same
circumstances. By refuting the use of a reasonable man standard, and instead, positing the necessity to consider the defendant's own perceptions, the court sanctions a subjective standard
when the jury applies the "reasonable" requirement of the perfect self-defense doctrine.
Although the jury instructions provided in the Aris case
were gender neutral, the jury did not consider Aris' actions in
light of her perceptions of the situation. 9• Instead, the court applied the identical defense doctrines which would be applied in a
situation where a male engaged in a brawl with a total stranger.
Since Aris did not kill a stranger and she suffered from battered
woman syndrome, it was inappropriate to solely examine the raw
facts when the judge decided against a self-defense instruction.
Other jurisdictions have reduced the defense burden when a
battered woman kills through modified applications of self-defense doctrines. For example, a North Dakota court adopted a
subjective standard of reasonableness. In State u. Leidholm, the
court required the jury to find only that, from the defendant's
point of view, she honestly and reasonably believed she was in
imminent danger of great bodily harm or death. 911
CALJIC 5.12 provides the jury with an instruction for justifiable homicide in self-defense. Since the perfect self-defense inwhich held that the use of a reasonable man objective standard of self-defense violated
Wanrow's right to equal protection of the laws. Wanrow shot an intoxicated, unarmed
man whom she knew had a reputation for violence when he approached her in a threatening manner. At the time of the killing, Wanrow was 5'4" tall, had a broken leg and was
using a crutch. The Court held that the use of the reasonable man standard in the jury
instructions was improper because it deprived Wanrow of the right to have the jury consider her conduct in light of her fear and perceptions of danger as affected by her status
as a woman. [d.
92. [d. at 559.
93. [d.
94. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
95. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983).
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struction is the battered woman's only chance for acquittal, it
must contemplate her perceptions at the time of the defensive
act.
1.

Present Instruction per CALJIC 5.12

CALJIC 5.12 states:
The killing of another person in self-defense is
justifiable and not unlawful when the person who
does the killing honestly and reasonably believes:
1. That there is imminent danger that the other
person will kill [him] [her] or cause [him] [her]
great bodily injury; and 2. That it was necessary
under the circumstances to kill the other person
to prevent death or great bodily injury to [himself] [herself]. In order to justify killing another
person in self-defense, actual danger or great bodily injury is not necessary. On the other hand, a
mere fear of death or great bodily injury is not
sufficient.98

2.

CALJIC 5.12 Revised 97

"The killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable
and not unlawful when the person who does the killing honestly
and reasonably believes: 1. That there is imminent danger that
the other person will kill [him) [her) or cause [him) [her) great
bodily injury; and 2. That it was necessary under the circumstances to kill the other person to prevent death or great bodily
injury to [himself) [herself).
In order for the defendant to harbor an honest belief in the
necessity to defend against imminent peril, it is essential that
an aggressor presently threatens or previously threatened
force. Where the defendant, at the time the fatal act occurred,
harbored an honest, actual and genuine perception of the need
to repel imminent peril, such defendant does not harbor malice. Relevant to the honesty of the defendant's belief are the
internal and external forces existing in the defendant'S life
96. CALlIC 5.12. Vol. 1 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
97. The italicized portion indicates proposed revisions to the instruction.
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which lend credence to the genuine need for subsequent defensive conduct against the present victim.
The reasonable belief requirement for the killing of another person in self-defense requires consideration of the defendant's perceptions of the situation and the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the killing. The totality of the circumstances' analysis considers whether a reasonable person,
similarly situated under the very same facts and circumstances, would perceive that it was necessary to kill to prevent
death or great bodily injury to [himself] [herself]. Consideration of the very same circumstances requires evaluation of the
testimony offered concerning the defendant's perceptions at
the time of the fatal act. The circumstances to be considered
include those which preceded the killing if the person claiming
justifiable homicide demonstrates that earlier incidents directly contributed to the perception of imminent danger. Actual danger or great bodily injury is not necessary."
3.

Significance of the Revisions to CALJIC 5.12

By allowing the jury to consider the internal as well as the
external forces which factor into the person who kills' honest
and actual belief of the present need to repel danger, a battered
woman's heightened perception of a threat will not be disregarded. The revised application of the reasonableness requirement permits the jury to consider a subjective standard while
retaining the reasonable objective standard. The instruction liberally considers the person who kills' perceptions of danger only
when that person can demonstrate that a direct and reasonable
correlation exists between the circumstances preceding the
death and the belief of the need to use deadly force.
B.

NEGATING MALICE TO REDUCE MURDER TO MANSLAUGHTER

In California, as elsewhere, the penalty for manslaughter is
significantly less than that for murder. First degree murder is
punishable by a term of twenty-five years to life, and second degree murder, where there is no showing of premeditation or de-
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liberation, results in confinement for fifteen years to life. 98 In
turn, voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment for
three, six or eleven years, and involuntary manslaughter is punishable by confinement for two, three or four years.99 If a battered woman is precluded from asserting a perfect self-defense
argument, then an alternative defense strategy would be to contend that despite the intentional act, she did not harbor malice.
1.

Legislative Opposition to Negating Malice

Presently under California law, reform to the mitigation
doctrines faces a major, although not insurmountable, legislative
obstacle. In 1981, the California legislature amended Penal Code
sections 28, 29, 188, and 189 through Senate Bill No. 54. 100 The
legal consequences of those amendments are that express malice
and intent to unlawfully kill are now one and the same, and the
California judicial system has abolished the partially excused defenses of diminished capacity defense and insanity.101
Prior to the amendments, Penal Code sections 28 and 29
permitted murder to be reduced to manslaughter, not only on
the statutory basis of the reasonable person objective standard
of provocation,t°2 but also on the subjective standard of defendant's voluntary intoxication or mental impairment. lOS Penal
Code section 28, as modified, provides in pertinent part that evidence of mental illness "shall not be admitted ... to negate capacity to form any mental state . . . but is admissible solely on
the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
malice aforethought when a specific intent crime is charged."104
A provision abolishing the defense of diminished capacity
was also included in the initiative measure adopted in June 1982
known as Proposition 8. Proposition 8 added Section 25 to the
98. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
99. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
100. S. 54, Regular Session (1981-1982); see People v. Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747,
758-59 (Ct. App. 1990) see supra note 5; see also People v. SailIe, 820 P.2d 588, 592-93
(Cal. 1991).

101.
102.
103.
104.

Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59, see supra note 5.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
See Saille, 820 P.2d at 592-93.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
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California Penal Code. That section provides: "The defense of
diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action
. . . evidence concerning an accused person's intoxication,
trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible
to show or negate capacity to form the ... intent, motive, malice
aforethought . . . or other mental state required for the commission of the crime charged. "1011
Penal Code section 188 now provides: "When it is shown
that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act
with express or implied malice . . . no other mental state need
be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought.
Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general
body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the definition of malice."106 Thus, once
an intentional killing is shown, malice aforethought is
established.
The Legislature's narrowing of the definition of express
malice and the resulting restriction on the scope of voluntary
manslaughter through amendments to sections 25, 28, and 29,
curtails the use of mens rea defenses. 107
In People v. Saille, the defendant argued that these amendments present a due process problem. lOB The Supreme Court
disagreed; instead, it stated that "the Legislature can limit the
mental elements included in the statutory definition of a
crime. moe The court further held that "[i]n amending section
188 in 1981, the Legislature equated express malice with an intent unlawfully to kill. Since two distinct concepts no longer exist, there has been some narrowing of the mental element included in the statutory definition of express malice. "110
However, the court noted that sections 28 and 29 still permit
expert testimony to show that because of mental illness or voluntary intoxication, the defendant did not actually form the in105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188.
107. Mens rea is Latin for a guilty state of mind. It defines the mental states accompanying a forbidden act: (1) intent; (2) knowledge; (3) recklessness; or (4) gross (criminal) negligence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
108. People v. SailIe, 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991).
109. [d.
110. [d.
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tent to unlawfully kill.1ll A defendant still may negate malice
which would in turn render the only supportable verdict to be
involuntary manslaughter or acquittal. 111
2.

Survival of the Other Mitigation Tools

The court, in People v.· Bobo, expressly held that the only
statutory mitigation tool that survived the 1981 legislation is
codified in Penal Code section 192.118 Section 192 proposes that
malice is presumed to be absent from a killing resulting from
sudden quarrel or heat of passion upon sufficient provocation. ll4
In Bobo, the court stated that "perhaps" voluntary manslaughter still encompasses the imperfect self-defense doctrine delineated in the 1979 Flannel decision. llli The court further noted
that because the imperfect self-defense doctrine did not apply to
the case at hand, it would not decide whether Proposition 8 and
the 1981 legislation abrogated the Flannel concept. U8
Although the defense of heat of passion or provocation survived the legislative amendments, suggested reform to this mitigation doctrine in order to simplify its application will likely encounter strong legislative opposition. Additionally, reform to the
present, yet tenuous, non-statutory imperfect self-defense doctrine, which might allow jurors to better empathize with the
plight of the battered woman who kills, stands to encounter even
greater opposition.

C.

STATUTORY VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER: HEAT OF PASSION
AND PROVOCATION

Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a
human in which malice is lacking because the fatal act occurred
under circumstances of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, otherwise known as adequate provocation. ll7 To reduce a murder
1l1.
1l2.
1l3.
1l4.
1l5.
1979).
1l6.
1l7.

1d.
1d.
See People v. Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (Ct. App. 1990) see supra note 5.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988).
See Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760; see also People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal.
Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760, see supra note 5.
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9, § 7.10(a·b).
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charge to manslaughter upon the ground of adequate provocation the defendant must satisfy two requirements: "[T]he provocation must be of such character and degree as naturally would
excite and arouse such passion and the assailant must act under
the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion."l18
The first element requires the presence of such passion "as
would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person ... of average disposition to act rationally and without deliberation and reflection and from such passion rather
than from judgment."u9
The second requirement, which is paramount to the efficacy
of this defense, is that the defendant must act out of fear. This
defense largely requires that after" 'heat of passion' was reasonably and justifiedly engendered, 'hot blood had not had time to
cool. . . .' "120 A court will not allow a homicide defendant to
succeed under a claim of heat of passion/provocation when the
use of force followed a "cooling off" pefiod. l21
In Aris, the court found that her fear "must have subsided
somewhat after the assault and threats ended."121 The court disregarded Aris' contention that because her "passion" was
aroused by a series of events over a considerable period of time,
it could not be subject to a standard "cooling off" period. The
court focused on the fact that Aris' husband was sleeping and
commented that: "A reasonable inference from the facts is that
the defendant experienced a peak of fear while she was beaten
and threatened which must have subsided somewhat after the
assault and threats ended. "123 The general testimony concerning
battered woman syndrome did not a,ssist her in a heat of passion
defense. The court did not want to burden the jury further by
requiring them to consider additional emotions in a case of voluntary manslaughter through heat of passion.124 Essentially, the
court rationalized its indifference to the plight of the battered
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (emphasis added).
[d.
People v. Cooley, 27 Cal. Rptr. 543, 555 (Ct. App. 1962).
See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1202-03.
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woman through an argument of judicial efficiency.
Modern voluntary manslaughter doctrine in the United
States is the successor to sixteenth and seventeenth century English common law.1811 The commonplace wearing of weapons
turned drunken brawls into deadly affairs. 186 The subsequent
difficulties in proving self-defense, and the fact that capital punishment was an unfair result for those who killed in mutual combat, prompted jurists to mitigate the crime of murder to manslaughter if the defendant was shown to have acted in the heat
of passion. U7 Present defense doctrines, which are derived from
the common law, contemplate the sudden, male, barroom-brawl
situation, and in turn, fail to consider some of the scenarios
which exist when battered women kill their aggressors.
The four elements of this common law defense still influence modern voluntary manslaughter doctrine: (1) a provocation
that would arouse a reasonable manUS to the heat of passion; (2)
the defendant was actually aroused to the heat of passion; (3) a
reasonable man 129 would not have cooled off; and (4) the defendant did not, in fact, cool Off.130
The "reasonable" components in criminal defense doctrines
are often very problematic. In Donna A. Coker's article, Heat of
Passion and Wife Killing, she considers the proposition that as
provocation must be such that a "reasonable" person would also
have been swayed by such passion, what does reasonableness
mean when "reasonable" people are never moved so entirely by
provocation to kill?181 Coker explores the work of Joshua
Dressler, who upon contemplating this question, suggested that
voluntary manslaughter applies to those killings committed
125. Donna A. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men
Who Kill, 2 REv. OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 79 (1992) (discussing the historical
irony concerning heat of passion killing. Males justify their violence on the grounds that
their adulterous female mates deserved it, or more subtly, the man was acting in "emotional" self-defense).
126. [d.
127. [d.
128. See CALlIC 8.42 which defines Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion and Provocation using "an ordinarily reasonable person" standard.
129. See CALJIC 8.43 which interprets the Cooling-Off Period according to "the
average or ordinarily reasonable person."
130. See Coker, supra note 125, at 79.
131. [d. at 99-101.
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under provocation that would cause the "ordinarily law-abiding
person to lose self-control."132 Dressler's words "ordinarily lawabiding person" contemplate the key boundary which might
render reform to the provocation definition to be perceived favorably by the California legislature. The California Penal Code
currently defines voluntary manslaughter in section 192:
Every person who unlawfully kills another human
being without malice aforethought but with an intent to kill, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in
violation of Section 192 of the Penal Code. ISS
No malice aforethought exists if the killing occurred [upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion]
[or] [in the honest but unreasonable belief in the
necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril
to life or great bodily injury].18'

CALJIC 8.42 and 8.43 provide the primary source of guidance for a jury when it applies a voluntary manslaughter instruction. m The goal of the proposed modifications is to draft new
pattern instructions which contemplate the battered woman's
emotional trauma and view subsequent acts in a more accurate
and deferential manner. A compatible goal is to remain within
the confines of the legislature's disdain for mitigation doctrines.
1. Present Instruction per CALJIC 8.42

Current CALJIC 8.42 instructs as follows:
"Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion and Provocation Explained: To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or
heat of passion, the provocation must be of such
character and degree as naturally would excite
and arouse such passion, and the assailant must
act under the influe.nce of that sudden quarrel or
heat of passion.
132. [d. at 100 (citing Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in
Search of a Rationale, 73 J.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 425-29 (1982».
133. See CALJIC 8.40. Vol. 1 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (defining voluntary manslaughter).
134. Id.
135. See CALJIC 8.42-8.43, Vol. 1 (1988 & Supp. 1993).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 5

158

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:131

The heat of passion which will reduce a
homicide to manslaughter must be such a passion
as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an
ordinarily reasonable person in the same circumstances. A defendant is not permitted to set up
[his] [her] own standard of conduct and to justify
or excuse [himself] [herself] because [his] [her]
passions were aroused unless the circumstances in
which the defendant was placed and the facts
that confronted [him] [her] were such as also
would have aroused the passion of the ordinarily
reasonable person faced with the same situation.
[Legally adequate provocation may occur in a
short, or over a considerable, period of time.]
The question to be answered is whether or
not, at the time of the killing, the reason of the
accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to
such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly
and without deliberation and reflection, and from
such passion rather than from judgment.

If there was provocation, [whether of short or
long duration,] but of a nature not normally sufficient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time
elapsed between the provocation and the fatal
blow for passion to subside and reason to return,
and if an unlawful killing of a human being followed such provocation and had all the elements
of murder, as I have defined it, the mere fact of
slight or remote provocation will not reduce the
offense to manslaughter."186

2.

CALJIC 8.42 Reuised 137

To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden
quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of such character and degree as naturally would cause excitement and
arousal to such passion in an ordinarily law-abiding person,
136. CALJIC 8.42 (1991 Revision).
137. The italicized portion indicates proposed revisions to the instruction.
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and that person must act under the influence of that sudden
quarrel or heat of passion.
The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to manslaughter must be of such passion as naturally would cause an
ordinarily law-abiding person to lose self-control in the same
circumstances or situation. Relevant to the ordinarily law-abiding person standard is evidence admitted at trial which either
demonstrates, or fails to demonstrate, a history of conduct depicting a loss of control and excitability to commit violent unlawful acts. Where such person's ability to reason is frequently
obscured or disturbed by some passion to act rashly or without
due deliberation or reflection, then the loss of control and excitability in the fact situation presented at trial ought to be
viewed without consideration of the proffered explanation for
extreme emotional disturbance above and beyond the fact situation immediate to the administration of the lethal act.
Conversely, where the evidence proffered at trial suggests
the perpetrator does not demonstrate a commonplace propensity to excitability to such a degree that reason is obscured or
disturbed by some passion causing that person to act rashly or
without due. deliberation or reflection, where the loss of control
resulting from the events appears to have provoked an otherwise ordinarily law-abiding person, then it is proper to consider
the totality of the admissible facts proffered by that person.
The totality of facts shall include a reasonable explanation
for extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the lethal act,
even where such extreme emotional disturbance may encompass events prior to the facts immediately surrounding the lethal act. A defendant is not permitted to set up [his] [her] own
standard of conduct and to justify or excuse [himself] [herself]
because [his] [her] passions were aroused unless the circumstances in which the defendant was placed and the facts confronted [him] [her], were such as also would have aroused the
passion of the ordinarily reasonable law-abiding person faced
with the same situation, in light of the totality of the circumstances described above.
The totality of the facts presented at trial which shall be
considered in determining whether the defendant has proffered
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evidence of legally adequate provocation may include facts
which occur over a short or long period of time.
Slight or remote provocation will not reduce an offense of
murder where the unlawful killing of a human being otherwise
satisfies all the elements of murder. Provocation which may
otherwise appear slight or remote when viewed narrowly to the
facts surrounding the administration of the lethal act may in
fact be reasonable, and thus, shall be found to be legally adequate where such provocation included other provoking circumstances arising slowly over time, where such ordinarily lawabiding person is provoked to violence beyond the extent to
which an ordinarily law-abiding person in similar circumstances or similarly situated would be expected to be provoked.
If sufficient time elapsed between the provocation and the
fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter.
3.

Significance of the CALJIC 8.42 Revisions

The legal consequences of the modifications to CALJIC 8.42
for a defendant who requests a voluntary manslaughter instruction is not per se an effortless avenue to negating malice. The
instruction broadens the scope of provocation by allowing the
jury to consider anything which provides a reasonable explanation for extreme emotional disturbance if it caused an otherwise
law-abiding person to lose control. The standard of "law-abiding" and "reasonable" furnishes a restraint on the application of
the doctrine. A battering male who kills his wife in a fit of rage
will not be afforded the broadened consideration of facts which
would precipitate a finding of legally adequate provocation. On
the other hand a battered woman, who is otherwise law abiding,
but responds to the emotional trauma induced by her mate's aggression and threats of violence, shall receive the broader consideration. Expert testimony "negating the inference of a predisposition to commit the charged crimes may be admissible as
character evidence. ms8
138. Susan Rutberg, Not Guilty By Reason of Victimization, 20 CACJ FORUM 36,
40, No.4 (1993) (discussing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder's (PTSD) effect on the behavior of people who have survived a variety of traumatic experiences and the links be-
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A prosecutor who anticipates application of the proposed
instruction will gather all admissible evidence which portrays
the defendant as non-law abiding, or one who is easily provoked
to lawless violence. In cases where the defendant's past acts preclude this proposed deferential standard, a jury will be constrained to the immediate facts at the time of the lethal acts.
The correct standard shall therefore be the objectively reasonable standard. A pretrial inquiry into prior convictions for similar
violent acts is pertinent to the determination whether the defendant is within the law-abiding standard. In domestic violence
cases, the number of police responses due to reports of unrest
will be equally relevant.
Use of prior bad acts will not violate California Evidence
Code section 1101; that section precludes specific instances of
defendant's prior conduct when offered to prove that his present
conduct comported with those prior instances of bad acts. 1S9 The
distinction between the type of evidence invited under the modifications to CALJIC 8.42 and the prohibitions delineated in section 1101 is that a defendant would seek to present evidence of
prior conduct to show conformity with the otherwise law-abiding
standard. It is the defendant who places her good character at
issue and then, the prosecution in turn, may rebut that evidence.
A defendant would be entitled to a voluntary manslaughter
instruction if such instruction is supported by substantial evidence proffered at trial. When a homicide defendant seeks to
benefit by the broadened provocation instruction, which would
be available for otherwise law-abiding citizens, that defendant
assumes the risk of prior specific instances of similar criminal
conduct being proffered by the prosecution.
In a criminal prosecution of a battered woman who kills, the
broadened definition of provocation more aptly addresses the
battered woman's plight than the present instruction which was
derived to accommodate the sixteenth and seventeenth century
weapon-toting male. The revised instruction implicitly invites
testimony of battered woman syndrome.
tween traumatic victimization and subsequent anti-social behavior).
139. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 1100-1107 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993).
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4. Present Instruction per CALJIC 8.43

CALJIC 8.43 instructs the jury with a standard for analyzing whether or not the defendant [in fact] acted under the passion aroused by the victim. The present instruction states:
Cooling Period: To reduce a killing upori a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion from murder to manslaughter the killing must have occurred while the
slayer was acting under the direct and immediate
influence of such quarrel or heat of passion.
Where the influence of the sudden quarrel or heat
of passion has ceased to obscure the mind of the
accused and sufficient time has elapsed for angry
passion to end and for reason to control his conduct, it will no longer reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter. The question as to whether
the cooling period has elapsed and reason has returned is not measured by the standard of the accused, but the duration of the cooling period is
the amount of time it would take the average or
ordinarily reasonable person to have cooled such
passion and for that person's reason to have
returned. 140

5.

CALJIC 8.43 Revised 141

"To reduce a killing upon a sudden quarrel, heat of passion
or provocation from murder to manslaughter the killing must
have occurred while the defendant was acting under the direct
and immediate influence of such quarrel, heat of passion or provoking circumstances. Where the influence of the sudden quarrel, heat of passion or provocation has ceased to obscure the
mind of the accused and sufficient time has elapsed for the loss
of control and obscured or disturbed reason to end, and where
the ability to act with due deliberation and judgment returns,
that influence will no longer reduce an intentional killing to
mans laughter.
The question as to whether the cooling period has elapsed
140. See CALJIC 8.43.
141. The italicized portions indicate revisions to the instruction.
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and reason has returned shall be measured by the duration of
time it would take the average or ordinarily reasonable person,
who was similarly situated in the same facts and circumstances
as proffered at trial and were proper for consideration under
CALJIC 8.42, to have cooled such passion and for that person's
reason to have returned."
6.

Significance of the CALJIC 8.43 Revisions

By allowing the jury to consider all the facts which are relevant to whether provocation was adequate, and whether the
cooling period has passed, the battered woman's defensive actions are less likely to be seen as retaliatory. In Aris, the court
held that her fear "must have subsided somewhat after the
threats and assault ended."u2 The court also disregarded Aris'
contention that her passion could not be subject to a standard
cooling period because it was aroused by a series of events occurring over a considerable period of time. us Accordingly, it is critical for a proper defense of a battered woman that the jury consider battered woman syndrome and the totality of the facts and
circumstances at the time of the fatal act.
Aris believed that she would not live until morning. u4 The.
need to secure a weapon prior to returning to her own home evidences her state of mind prior to firing the fatal shot. Specifically, unless a woman suffered from a motivational and emotional deficit, why would she leave a potentially safe-harbor and
return to the home when she believed that she might not live
until morning? Returning to the home suggests that her judgment had not returned. A juror who does not suffer from battered woman syndrome, nor receives defense instructions which
address that syndrome and the principles of learned helplessness, may label the behavior of returning to the home and killing
the sleeping abuser as a premeditated retaliatory action.
A critical legal distinction exists between an isolated battering incident which may occur in a bar and one which occurs
to a battered woman. If the batterer's violence and threats
142. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
143. [d.
144. See id. at 171.
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which occurred the night of Aris' fatal actions were isolated,
then it would be appropriate to exclusively consider the facts
and circumstances in which she was placed at the time of the
fatal shot. An isolated instance of abuse does not trigger the
need for consideration of extraneous variables. When there is an
on-going pattern of abuse, however, application of the present
heat of passion or provocation doctrine is legally insufficient to
provide a battered woman with a viable, gender-equal defense.

D.

NON-STATUTORY MANSLAUGHTER: IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE

The other type of voluntary manslaughter, under the imperfect self-defense doctrine, continues to be recognized in California. 1411 The non-statutory doctrine applies to "reduce an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter when a person kills
under an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury."146 Accordingly, imperfect self-defense issues arise when a defender intentionally kills an assailant with a belief which, although
honestly held, fails to meet the reasonable person standard. 147
The California Supreme Court, in People u. Flannel, held that
an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself
from imminent peril to life negates malice aforethought. 148 The
Flannel doctrine arose under the following factual scenario: in a
street brawl, the defendant shot the victim under a mistaken belief that the victim approached him with a switchblade knife. 149
Compatible with the provocation and heat of passion defense,
the imperfect self-defense doctrine arose under a circumstance
of a sudden onset of force which would be present in an isolated
145. People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 590 n.1 (Cal. 1991). The court granted review to
resolve conflict in the courts of appeal concerning the impact of legislation abolishing
diminished capacity on the crime of manslaughter. In affirming the first degree murder
and attempted murder convictions, the California Supreme Court held that the law of
the state no longer permits a reduction of murder to non·statutory manslaughter due to
involuntary intoxication and/or mental disorder. Id.
146. Id. (citing People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979».
147. See Flannel, 603 P.2d at 4.
148. Id. at 2. The court rejected defendant's argument that the court erred in failing
to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that defendant's honest but unreasonable belief that he
must defend himself from deadly attack negates malice to reduce the defense from mur·
der to manslaughter. The unreasonable self·defense doctrine was not a general principle
of law at that time; consequently, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on
that defense. See id.
149. Id. at 3.
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aggressive situation.
Although the Aris court instructed the jury on the imperfect
self-defense doctrine, it nonetheless found the presence of malice. 1110 The court held that Aris simply could not have maintained an honest belief in the need to defend herself from her
sleeping husband's prior threats. By reforming the imperfect
self-defense instruction to allow consideration of the heightened
sensitivity to danger, which is intrinsic in a woman suffering
from battered woman syndrome, the jury may view the battered
woman's honest and genuine belief in a more deferential
manner.
1.

Present Instruction per CALJIC 5.171 111

CALJIC 5.17 provides the instruction for an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend. Where the evidence
warrants this instruction, it is usually provided in conjunction
with CALJIC 8.40 which defines Voluntary Manslaughter.
CALJIC 5.17 instructs a jury as follows:
"A person, who kills another person in the honest
but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend
against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but does not harbor malice
aforethought and is not guilty of murder. This
would be so even though a reasonable person in
the same situation seeing and knowing the same
facts would not have had the same belief. Such an
honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense to
the crime of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary]
manslaughter. "IG2

2.

CALJIC 5.17 Revised lll3

In order for the defendant to harbor a reasonable belief in
the necessity to defend against imminent peril, it is essential
150.
151.
152.
153.

See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
CALJIC 5.17, Vol. 1 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
CALJIC 5.17, Vol. 1 (1988 & Sup. 1993).
The italicized portions indicate revisions to the instruction.
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that there is a present aggressor manifesting a threat to carry
out previously threatened force. Where the defendant, at the
time the fatal act occurred, harbored an honest, actual and
genuine perception of the need to repel imminent peril, although factually such belief is unreasonable, such defendant
does not harbor malice. Relevant to the honesty of the defendant's belief are the internal and external forces existing in the
defendant's life which lend credence to the genuine need for
subsequent defensive conduct against the present victim. Such
an honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime
of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary] manslaughter.
3.

Significance of the Revisions to CALJIC 5.17

The revised portion of CALJIC 5.17 again implicitly enables
the battered woman who kills to assert a defense which addresses battered woman syndrome. The modified instruction
considers internal and external forces which are relevant to the
defendant's genuine perception. Evidence of battered woman
syndrome not only explains how a battered woman might think,
react or behave, it places the behavior in an understandable
light. How the fact-finders may think the average, reasonable
person would behave, or how they think they personally would
behave are not necessarily similar to the manner in which a battered woman may behave. Although the honesty of a defendant's
belief is not viewed in an objective light, the jury might reach
conclusions concerning the honesty of the belief based on their
own good faith misconceptions. U4
The proposed revisions to CALJIC 5.17 are consistent with
the California Legislature's 1991 addition to the California Evidence Code. Newly added section 1107 provides: "In a criminal
action, expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution
or defense regarding battered women's syndrome, including the
physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence. . . . "11111 Although section 1107 was not intended to substantively alter the
154. People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 925 (Ct. App. 1992) (reversing defendant's
voluntary manslaughter conviction due to counsel's failure to investigate and present
evidence of battered women's syndrome).
155. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
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Penal Code,166 enactment of this section may be seen as an acknowledgement of the misconceptions concerning battered woman syndrome. Reform to the imperfect self-defense instruction,
like the adoption of Evidence Code section 1107, directly enhances the battered woman who kills' chance for a fair defense.
The revisions to CALJIC 5.17 will not apply to every defendant seeking to negate malice through the honest but unreasonable defense doctrine. The new language which permits consideration of those "internal or external factors" which lend
credence to the honest belief for the "genuine need to use force
against the present victim" precludes evidence of a generalized
diminished capacity. That is, a defendant who does not suffer
from battered woman syndrome may not assert that he maintained a heightened perception to danger. In contrast, the defendant who harbors a lower degree of culpability and who suffers from battered woman syndrome or who acted under some
other internal or external force must receive a defense instruction which addresses those factors.
The motivational and emotional deficits Aris suffered are
not present in the situation in which one must suddenly defend
oneself in a brawl with a stranger. Battered women, therefore,
have a valid argument that the legal defense instructions violate
their right to an adequate criminal defense.1II7 Failure to contemplate the plight of a battered woman when administering the
defense instructions precludes women like Aris from an adequate defense.
V. CONCLUSION
The addition of Evidence Code section 1107 allows the jury
to consider battered woman syndrome when applying the criminal defense instructions to a fact situation. This initial reform
provides the jury with insight into why a battered woman acts as
she does. Only with added insight may a jury fairly decide the
ultimate question whether there was a justified use of force or
whether manslaughter is more appropriate than a murder ver156. Id. § l107(d).
157. See, e.g., U.S.

CONST.

amend. V & XIV (guaranteeing right to due process of

law).
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dict. However, absent the reforms suggested above, a trial judge
may continue to preclude a requested defense instruction for the
battered woman who kills. Until defense instructions expressly
or impliedly recognize extrinsic and internal factors which distort perceptions of danger and lead to emotional and motivational deficits, courts will continue to disregard a battered woman who kills' lower culpability. Since a juror may never walk a
day in Aris' shoes, or any other battered woman's, the jury must
be provided with defense instructions which consider the plight
of the battered woman in light of all the facts. Only then will the
criminal defense doctrines ensure that the battered woman who
refuses to take one more beating receives a fair trial.
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